Since the seminal work of Altman (1968) , research into prediction of corporate failure has been well researched, developed and replicated for various financial markets. However, this topic has been less well-researched in emerging markets due to a large number of impediments; one of which being the short history of financial markets. The aims of the study are twofold: (1) to formulate a model that predicts corporate financial distress and (2), to apply the model to trace the potential failure of Malaysian financially distressed firms due to the Asian Financial Crisis of 1997. Financial ratios and multiple discriminant analysis were utilised to achieve the research objective of developing a model for the prediction of corporate financial distress. The model successfully predicts firm's health at the rate of 88%, with 86% Type I accuracy and 90% Type II accuracy. A new sample of financially distressed firms from the Asian Financial Crisis period was introduced to assess the model superiority. The predictive accuracy of the model reveals that it was significantly better than chance. The model prov ides evidence that the signs of distress were in existence long before the crisis. The final variables of the model are consistent with Claessens et al. (1998) and Pomerleano's (1998) arguments regarding the vulnerabilities facing Malaysian firms during the Asian Financial Crisis.
INTRODUCTION
Prediction of corporate financial distress has long been the object of study of corporate finance literature. Since the seminal work of Altman (1968) , numerous researchers have attempted to improve upon and replicate such studies in capital markets worldwide i . However, i n the context of emerging economies, this topic has received much less attention due to the many impediments; one of which being the short history of the market. Although corporate failures are perceived to be a problem of developed economic environments (Altman et al., 1979) , firms operating in emerging economies are no exception. In fact, Altman (1984) showed that the total costs of bankruptcy are substantial and firms incur bankruptcy costs in the range of 11% to 17% of the firm value three years prior to bankruptcy in developed economies. We therefore contend that if failures can be prevented in emerging economies, the cost savings could be substantial.
The motivation to undertake this study was provided following the many of corporate failures in the Malaysian capital market in the last decade. For example, 62% of Malaysian listed firms became illiquid and 8% insolvent in 1997 and 1998 (Claessens, 1998) . In addition, Ferri et al. (1998) report that the problems of corporate financial structures in East Asian corporations (including Malaysia) have been an important factor in contributing to the East Asian Financial Crisis and leading many Corporations to bankruptcy. They rightly deduce that financial excess in East Asian countries led to financial distress and consequently to the crisis in the region. Therefore, there is a need to deve lop a model to assess the financial health of firms in a Malaysian context. The research findings from developed economies are not suitable to apply to Malaysian firms due to the differences in market structures; socio-economic factors, provision and implementation of law, the political environment and accounting standards in these economies, which result in differences in financial reporting (Her and Choe, 1999) .
This study describes the development of a model for prediction of corporate distress and pro vides evidence on financial structures faced by Malaysian firms that triggered and aggravated the East Asia Financial Crisis. The final variables in our prediction model support Claessens et al. (1998) and Pomerleano's (1998) findings that Malaysian firms are highly leveraged (i.e., excessive long-and short-term borrowings), have excessive investments and excessive low profitability that contributed to the crisis. Finally, the validation procedure provides evidence to support the notion that those symptoms of crisis were already in existence long before the crisis.
In Malaysia, firms are deemed to be under financial distress when they apply to the relevant authorities requesting the restructuring of their organisations based on a scheme of arrangement pursuant to section 176 to 178 of the Malaysian Companies Act 1965 ii . Firms under protection of this provision have to formulate survival options including proposals on strategies for corporate rescues and reconstruction iii . Highly leveraged corporations with severe financial problems might resort to outright liquidation iv . In light of the above, the objective of this study is to develop a model that is able to discriminate between distressed and non-distressed Malaysian firms. These attributes could well provide an important insight for policy makers and to financial institutions to guide them to devise effective pre-emptive measures to mitigate corporate failure.
The paper is organised into five sections. The following section offers a critique of the Multiple Discriminant Analysis (MDA) model and failure prediction model. Section 3 provides the data collection and research methodology. The fourth section offers the results and a discussion of the research findings. The final section provides conclusions of the study, its implications and suggestions for future research.
CRITICISMS OF THE MDA MODEL AND FAILURE PREDICTION MODELS
The use of Multiple Discriminant Analysis (MDA) in business failure prediction studies has been widely accepted since its inception by Altman (1968) . Despite its success, criticisms emerged regarding the statistical procedures employed. For example, the application of linear MDA was not preceded by tests to determine its optimality in most financial studies (Joy and Tollefson, 1975) . Karels and Prakash (1987) stressed that MDA procedure will be optimal only if the normality conditions are met; otherwise, the conclusions derived are suspect v . They conducted a study with the aim of investigating whether or not the financial ratios used in previous studies satisfy the normality conditions required by the MDA technique. Fifty financial ratios were tested. Only nine of the ratios were found normal, and six ratios found lognormal. These ratios were then used to construct a MDA model. The model developed correctly classified 98 percent of the non-bankrupt group and 100 percent of the bankrupt group. They concluded that no matter how complicated the procedures used, they do not necessarily provide better results if the ratios used depart from the normality assumptions. The problem of the lack of normality assumption can be reduced through transformation of financial ratios (Hair et al., 1995) as carried out by Altman et al. (1977) in developing their ZETA model. Furthermore, a time "bias" might have been incorporated into the classic business failure model, most of which was developed between the late 1960's and the 1980's. Begley et al. (1995) studied the issue of time bias by applying the Altman (1968) and Ohlson (1980) model to a matched sample of failed and non-failed firms from the 1980's. They found that predictive accuracy was significantly reduced when applied to the 1980's data. Begley et al. (1995) stated that the models were inappropriate for time frames different from those in which the model was developed.
DATA COLLECTION AND METHODOLOGY
The data used in this study is a set of financial ratios derived from financial statements of sampled failed listed companies for the period from 1980 to 1996. The above cut-off period was selected due to the financial crisis experienced by Asian countries including Malaysia for the years between1997 and 2000 when stock markets in the region were badly affected. This study only focuses on corporate financial distress for the period before the Asian Fin ancial Crisis due to the following reasons. First, the associations of abnormal returns to 'unexpected' information components of accounting data are sensitive to the business cycle (Lev and Thiagarajan, 1993; Johnson, 1993) . Second, risk premiums are not stationary across business cycles (Gooding and O'Malley, 1977; Wiggens, 1992; and Kruegger and Johnson, 1990 ) and subsequently; accounting data has been shown to be associated with variations in risk premiums (Beaver, Kettler and Scholes, 1969) . Finally, the content of accounting data of failed and non-failed companies differs in periods of recession and non-recession (Richardson et al, 1998) . Therefore, firms from the crisis period were omitted from the sample.
The sample companies used in this study were selected from firms that were listed on the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange (KLSE). The KLSE was ranked as one of the largest stock exchanges in Asia with a market capitalisation of RM464.99 billion at the end of 2001 compared to RM444.35 billion the previous year . Also, the total number of companies that are listed on the KLSE has increased significantly since its incorporation in 1973 with 262 companies as compared to 621 in 1996 and 812 in December 2001.
A paired sample design technique was employed, where each failed firm has a non-failed "match" in the sample for the same period. Nevertheless, there have been criticisms of this technique, for instance, Palepu (1986) argued that the use of a matched sample of failed and non-failed firms (oneto-one match) might create a potential firm failure bias. He also claimed that the potential for failure is overstated using this technique. Palepu (1986) stressed that this bias may or may not be important depending on the usage of the model. If the model is used to rank the firms for the potential failure in order to perform a more detailed analysis, then the bias is not important. However, if the model is used to identify investment portfolio selection, then the bias is significant. Zmijewski (1984) reviewed 17 stud ies related to financial distress that used the above method and found that although a choice based sample bias was present, the results do not indicate significant changes in overall classification and classification rates. Finally, Platt and Platt (1990, 1991) highlighted the fact that a one-to-one sampling technique is still an acceptable method in failure prediction studies.
In our study, listed firms that meet the criteria in any one or a combination of situations mentioned below are classified as distressed firms. The definition of distress is taken from the firms that were protected under Section 176 of the Malaysian Companies Act 1965 between 1980 to 1996; the firms that were granted approval to undertake company restructuring to revive financial conditions by the KLSE, the Securities Commission (SC) or by the relevant authorities and the firms that were put under receivership vi .
Thirty-three distressed firms were thus sampled and matched with 33 non-distressed firms, which were randomly selected and were based on the following criteria:
1. Same industry as the failed firm 2.
Closest asset size 3.
Similar age since incorporation
The above criteria were set as control factors to ensure minimum bias in the selection of the control sample used in the developm ent of the failure prediction model. Furthermore, the use of the one-toone matched procedure is consistent with previous studies documented in Beaver (1966) , Altman (1968 ), Blum (1974 and others.
We identified the distressed firms from information contained in the KLSE daily diary for the years under study. Each firm listed on the KLSE is required to announce immediately any information related to their companies as prescribed by the KLSE listing requirement. Information on the distressed firms that announced their financial status was obtained by examining these documents for the period under study on a daily basis. After obtaining the names and related information of the distressed firms, the financial information of these firms was obtained from the a nnual financial statements published for five years prior to distress. The collected financial statements were then grouped according to the year before distress. For example, if two firms were distressed in 1980 and 1996, respectively, and their most current financial statements were prepared on 31 December 1979 and 1995, respectively, the first year before distress would include the 1979 statements of the former and the 1995 statements of the latter. The fifth year before distress would include the 1975 and 1991 statements. The financial statements of the non-distress firms had the same fiscal years as those of their distress mates. The financial statement data of the non-distress firms were stratified into years before distress, equivalent to the years assigned to their distress mates.
The dependent variable is a dichotomous variable of distressed or non-distressed firms. The independent variables are the 64 selected financial ratios used by Beaver (1966) , Altman (1968) and Ou and Penmen (1989) .
RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS

Univariate Analysis
Our sample consists of 33 non-financial listed firms that experienced financial distress before the Asian Financial Crisis began in 1997. These distress firms were matched with non-distress firms from the same fiscal year. The means of the financial indicators for the distress and non-distress firms were calculated and are presented in Table 1 . The average total assets of the distressed firms are RM154 million, whereas the non-distress firms have an average of RM107 million. The nearest asset size between the two groups was used as a criterion to match these firms. It is shown that the average of the total liabilities of distressed firms is significantly higher than nondistressed firms at RM123 million and RM43 million respectively. This excessive liability is further supported by the long-term liabilities and current liabilities figures. The high liabilities of the distress firms support the notion that their vulnerabilities stem from excessive long-and short-term liabilities (excessive borrowings) as highlighted by Claessens et al. (1998) and Pomerleano (1998) . Furthermore, the comparison of the average of total assets fi gure provided above coupled with the fixed assets, current assets, inventory and account receivables figures of distressed firms being much higher than non-distressed firms. The vulnerable of distressed firms seems to arise from excessive investments in fi xed and current assets.
Finally, the average sales of the distressed firms were found to be slightly lower than non-distressed firms. However, significant differences were found in the net income/(loss), income before interest and tax, and retained earnings figures. On average, the distress firms incurred losses of RM8 million as compared to their counterparts with profits of RM7 million. The income before interest and tax for the distress and non-distress firms were RM0.5 million and RM9 million respectively. On the other hand, the distress firms paid RM8 million interest compared to RM2 million paid by the nondistressed firms. As a result, the retained earnings of the distressed firms are significantly lower than their non-distressed counterpart. Therefore, it can conclude that the distress firms experienced excessive low profitability compared to non-distressed firms.
The financial behaviour of the distress firms discussed above provides some insight into the vulnerabilities of Malaysian firms that led to the Asian Financial Crisis of 1997. Excessive borrowing and investments, coupled with excessive low profitability are significant characteristics of Malaysian firms. These characteristics affected the economy of the country and eventually led towards financial crisis.
Estimation of Discriminant Model
Using a sample of distressed and non-distressed firms as the dependent variable and the ratios as the independent variables, a forward stepwise Multiple Disciminant Analysis (MDA) was used to ascertain the discriminating power of the variables. In stepwise estimation, independent variables were entered into the discriminant function one at a time on the basis of their discriminating power. The normal variables were entered into the discriminant analysis vii . Three groups of prospective variables were tested viii . Finally, one group that gives the highest hit ratio was selected. The Mahalanobis D² measure was used to select variables that produce the greatest separation for the pair of groups, which are closest at a particular step (Hair et al, 1995) . This process begins with all of the variables excluded from the model and chooses the variable that maximises the Mahalanobis distance between the groups. The F test was used as an additional means of interpreting the relative discriminating power of the independent variables. NI denote not included. Using F Ratio, it is identified that V11, V15 and V53 have minimal discriminatory power and therefore they were not included in the analysis. Table 2 above provides the statistical results of the MDA where the significant variables were determined and ranked accordingly. Using stepwise procedure, the significant variables were identified as in Table 2 since this procedureprevents the non-significant variables from entering the function. From the discriminant loadings and univariate F values, the ranking of discriminating power of variables were identified. In the six variables function, Total Liabilities to Total Assets (V12) discriminated the most with the highest discriminant loading and F statistics, and Cash to Total Assets (V13) discriminating the least. The finding reveals that the liabilities and assets of distressed firms are important financial indicators, which allow us to discriminate between distressed, and non-distressed firms. These findings support our argument in the univariate analysis. The results of our analysis show that the non-distressed group centroid (Dependent variable [DV]=0) is at -1.107 and the distress group (DV=1) centroid is at 1.107 that independently classifiesdistress and non-distressedfirms. To make our analysis more meaningful, a single cutting score was calculated. The cutting score of the function equals to zero, which was calculated on the average values of both centroids. The procedure for classifying firms is as follows: (1) classify a firm as a distress firm if its discriminant score has a positive value, and (2) classify a firm as a non-distress firm if its discriminant score has a negative value. The assessment of the predictive accuracy of the discriminant function using classification matrices is summarised in Table 3 . The model classification accuracy is 88.1 percent (average of correct classification of DV=0 at 86.2 percent and DV=1 at 89.9 percent) on the analysis sample and the holdout sample accuracy rate at 91 percent (average of correct classification of DV=0 at 94 percent and DV=1 at 88 percent). In the cross-validation tests, the classification accuracy marginally declined to 86.7 percent (average of correct classification of DV=0 at 85.3 percent and DV=1 at 88.1 percent). The superior model's accuracy rate achieved in this study implies that it has potential for application in the real world. The final variables in the model are consistent with our findings in univariate analysis. As mentioned earlier, the financial characteristics of of Malaysian firms during the Asian Financial Cris is were excessive borrowing and investment and excessive low profitability (Claessens et al., 1998; Pomerleano, 1998) . Five variables were found to significantly discriminate between distressed and non-distressed firms in the multiple discriminant analysis , namely: Total Liabilities to Total Assets, Asset Turnover, Inventory to Total Assets, Sales to Inventory and Cash to Total Assets. All of the significant variables explain the vulnerabilities of Malaysian firms that resulted in financial difficulties for them during the Asian Financial Crisis.
External Validation
Before making any generalisations, the model was tested for external validity. Under this test, we introduced forty-three firms as a new sample, which consisted of distressed firms during the As ian Financial Crisis. As Lehman (1991) points out , "Internal validity asks whether an experiment's conclusion is warranted. External validity, on the other hand, asks whether the results of an experiment can be generalised beyond the specific situation."
In this procedure, it was found that the model correctly classified the entire new sample as distressed firms in their respective distress years, and also a year before the actual distress (Refer to Table 4 Panel A). In the two-year period before the distress year, 86% of the new sample was found to have experienced distress and the balance was misclassified. The prediction accuracy rate increases as it nears distress year. In this case, actual distress increased from 42%, 54% and 70% respectively up to 1997. 
Note:
There is missing data for distressed year (DY) resulting in the total sample being reduced to 42 firms.
The above findings provide evidence that the model predicts distress better than chance and has the potential to be applied in practice. The model's accuracy rate is consistently above 50% chances, as far as 4 years before the actual distress event. This is consistent with the actual performance achieved in the analysis sample and cross-validation procedures as provided in Table 3 . 
n.a. denotes that the respective data is not available for analysis Interestingly, we found an area where the Z Score for both distressed and non-distress firm's overlap. This is referred to by Altman (1968) as the "zone of ignorance". Many prediction studies refer to this area as a "grey area" where the distributions of distress and non-distress overlap. To interpret the ZScores more meaningfully, researchers generate a cut off point to separate the Z-Scores for both groups. In our study, the centroid for distress firms are -1.106 and non-distress firms is1.106 and any Z-Score between these two centroids falls into the grey area. The overlap area is one where the distressed and non-distressed firm's financial characteristics cluster together. In reality, this area is where the transition period of non-distressed firms becoming failures or vice versa occurs.
Furthermore, we have calculated and identified the cutting score at 0 and Z-Scores and can be interpreted as; (1) Distress: if Z-Scores>1.106, (2) Grey Area -Distress (has a distress criterion but is expected to deteriorate or improve): if 1.106>Z-Score>0, (3) Grey Area -Non-Distress (has a nondistress criterion but is expected to improve or deteriorate): if 0>Z-Score>1.106, and (4) Non Distress: if Z-Score<-1.106. Although we can conclude that a firm is either distressed or non-distressed using the cutting score, it is more meaningful if the firms can be classified into a more detailed financial health group based on Z-Scores attained and our 4 states of Z-Score above. A detailed analysis of the accuracy rate in the external validation procedure is provided in Panel B and Panel C of Table 4 . It can be seen that 14% of the new sample were non-distressed in the 5 years prior to the distress year; deteriorated gradually to 2% in the 2 years before the distress year, and were at none in one year before the distress year. The Z-Score for each of the new samples in the external validation procedures is provided in Table 5 where the Z-Score of each firm reveals that their performance deteriorates when approaching the distress year.
To further illustrate the movement of the Z-Score from 5 years before the distress year up to the distress year, we extracted the six firms that were identified as non-distressed firms in Table 4 (Panel C) from Table 5 and tabulated this information in Table 6 . The names of the six firms are as follows: Associated Kaolin Industries Bhd, Autoways Holdings Bhd, Parit Perak Holdings Bhd, Plantation & Development, Malaysia Bhd, Promet Bhd and Rahman Hydraulic Tin Bhd. Associated Kaolin Industries Bhd was classified as a non distressed firm 5 years before distress and gradually deteriorated to the grey area -non distress" in years 3 and 4 before distress, and subsequently to "grey -distress" 2 years before distress, and finally to distress in the distress year. It was found that the same trend applied to the other 4 firms. Therefore, it is important to identify firms in the grey or overlapping area (-1.1065<Z-score<1.1065) in applying this model. Early remedial action could be taken for firms that are suspected to be in a distressed or grey area if detected in advance using our model. Failure could be prevented and much public money could be saved if the firms' health could be assessed and distress symptoms could be detected at an early stage. We also found that the distressed firms that were used in our external validation procedures (Table 4 : Panel B and C) showed distress symptoms as early as 5 years before the distress year. Our finding is consistent with Nam and Jinn (2000) , who claimed that the crisis of 1997 was not just a temporary foreign exchange crisis but also the result from poor performance of Malaysian firms over a long period.
CONCLUSION
The prediction of corporate distress is a common issue in developed economies but has only recently emerged in less developed economies such as Malaysia. Since the initial work of Altman (1968) , numerous studies have attempted to improve upon and replicate the model in different capital markets world-wide. However, this topic has been less well-researched in emerging markets due to several major impediments; one of which being the short history of emerging markets. Therefore, this study is important to stakeholders because the issue of prediction of corporate failure from the Malaysian firms' perspectives was revealed.
A model of prediction of corporate distress for Malaysian companies was successfully developed in this study. The model was tested for its predictive accuracy and subjected to both the internal and external validity tests. The model shows exceptional performance with high correct classification accuracy rate (more than 80 %) both in internal and external validity, and showed great potential for predicting firms' distress. 88%prediction accuracy was observed in the analysis sample and 87% in the cross-validated procedures. The model performance was further tested in external validation, where forty-three new distress firms from the Asian Financial Crisis period were introduced. Our findings suggest that the models are reliable and have good practical use for making decisions in real markets, as the validation tests showed the model performed better than chance with more than 50% accuracy as far back as 4 years before the distress event. Taking into consideration the grey area discussed in the previous section, the model showed superior performance (i.e., better than chance) in all years and can predict as far as 5 years before the actual distress. In addition, 5 ratios were found to be significant out of the 64 financial ratios used in this study to discriminate between distress and nondistress firms. The significant variables are ranked in descending order of their discriminating power, these are: 1. Total Liabilities to Total Assets (V12) 2. Asset Turnover (V29) 3. Inventory to Total Assets (V32) 4. Sales to Inventory (V51) 5. Cash to Total Assets (V13)
These variables coupled with the univariate analysis findings reported in the ear lier section of this paper support Claessens et al. (1998) and Pomerleano's (1998) arguments regarding the financial characteristics of Malaysian firms during the crisis. 'Total Liabilities' relates to short-and long-term borrowings, 'Total Assets', 'Inventory' and 'Cash' show firms' investments and 'Sales' relates to performance and eventually to profitability. All of these final variables support the notion that Malaysian firms that experienced distress have excessive borrowings and investment as well as excessive low profitability. Also, the model successfully traced the root of the financial distress of Malaysian firms. We found that distress symptoms were in existence long before the Asian Financial Crisis in 1997 and concluded that if those symptoms could have been detected earlier, the impact of the crisis might have been minimal.
This study reported on the existence of four states of a firm's performance as a result of Z Score generated by the model: namely "distress", "grey area -distress", "grey area -non-distress" and "non-distress". The grey area was formerly described as the "zone of ignorance" by Altman (1968) . This area is where firms share distress and non-distress financial characteristics and should be carefully observed before it is too late for any recovery action.
The limitations of this study include the fact that analysis of specific industries was not possible due to a small sample size, and that the cash flow and profitability variable were excluded from further analysis due to transformation problems. Further research is needed that focuses on the above issues on corporate financial distress. As a result of the Asian Financial Crisis, there is an urgent need to undertake research to understand the capital structures and other financial indicators such as microand macroeconomic variables that might affect a firm's performance, and eventually develop a prediction model for distressed and non-distressed firms.
Endnote i There is an array of literature relating to the prediction of corporate distress (bankruptcy prediction) have been documented by writers such as Altman (1968) , Altman, Haldeman and Narayanan (1977) , Altman, Baidya, and Dias (1979) , Takahashi, Kurokawa and Watase (1984) , Theodossiou (1993) , Richardson, Kane and Lobingier (1998) , Nam and Jinn (2000) , Ginoglou, Agorastos and Hatzigagious (2002) . Altman (1993) reviewed a large number of bankruptcy prediction studies worldwide.
ii To mitigate the negative effects of winding up and to give a time span for the insolvent company to take remedial action in view of future improvement, restructuring alternatives may be considered. In Malaysia, corporate financial restructuring is the first step taken to rescue a problematic business entity before the company is put under receivership or liquidated.
iii There are a number of corporate restructuring modes that are ruled out by Section 176 to 178 of the Malaysian
Companies Act 1965. Among the alternatives that are available are compromise with the creditors and members (Section 176 to 177) and facilitation of reconstruction and amalgamations (Section 178). The commercial meaning that applies to the terms are as follows; (1) a "compromise" is an arrangement in which parties conflicting interests agree to accommodate each side by adjustment or modification of their interest; (2) a "reconstruction" is a rearranging of a company's structure that may involve transfer of assets of one company to a new company or an alteration to the capital structure of the company or group of companies with the same persons as shareholders; (3) an "amalgamation" is where two or more companies merge together or one company may absorb another under common control; (4) an "arrangement " is defined through Section 176 of the act to include reorganisation of the share capital of a company by consolidation and/or division of different classes of shares. iv The restructuring alternatives might be taken to mean one of the following; (1) a compromise or arrangement with debenture holders, creditors and shareholders with variation, adjustment or modification of their rights; (2) take over by a new company of the assets of another company with the same persons retaining control. The shareholders of the company whose assets were taken over will receive cash or shares in the new company (i.e. a reconstruction). The compromise and arrangement action was taken with the aim to restrain creditor action or deferring of payment of liabilities pursuant to Sections 176 and 178 of the Malaysian Companies Act 1965. v Normality refers to the degree to which the distribution of the sample data corresponds to a normal distribution. Hair et al. (1995) highlight the fact that "the most fundamental assumption in multivariate analysis is the normality of the data, referring to the shape of the data distribution for an individual metric variable and its correspondence to the normal distribution, the benchmark for statistical methods. If the variation from the normal distribut ion is sufficiently large, all resulting statistical tests are invalid." vi Recently, the KLSE issued Practice Note No. 4/2001 (PN4) with the aim of providing a guideline for failed firms or "an affected listed issuer". In this note, a firm is classified as a distress firm when the following occurs; (i) a firm with deficit in its adjusted shareholders' equity; (ii) a receiver or managers have been appointed over the property of the firms; (iii) the auditors have expressed adverse or disclaimer opinion in r espect of the firm's going concern, in its latest audited accounts; or (iv) special administrators have been appointed over the firm's subsidiary or major associated companies pursuant to the provisions of the Pengurusan Danaharta Nasional Berhad Act 1998. vii Before the discriminant analysis was performed, all independent variables were subject to a normality test. One variable was found normal, nine variables lognormal and three variables square root normal. However, the variables that had potential to be negative values were excluded from the analysis due to problems with transforming the data. Also, variables that were not normal in all procedures were excluded from further analysis. viii A correlation test was performed and it was found that a number of variables highly correlated with each other. Instead of dropping/deleting the highly correlated variables, three potential groups were constructed which exclusively include the highly correlated variables.
